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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE N. MASON,
Plaintiff and Appellamt,

vs.
TOOELE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Case No.
12132

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff per
se, on May 22, 1969, for judgment in the sum of
$650.00 for excess sewer and water connection fees
paid under protest and $10,000.00 punitive damages,
and for the order of the Court requiring the defendant to accept sewer and water connection fees
on additional lots in accordance with a lower price
stated in a written contract.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings in iits favor was granted and the
complaint was dismissed. The plaintiff's motion for
a re-hearing was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the judgment of the
lower Court that the costs provided in the written
contract were for installation expenses and not connection fees and, in the alternative, for the opportunity to at least present evidence in support of his complaint in a trial of the issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff was the owner of eight (8) resi·
dential building lots on South Coleman Street in
Tooele City, Tooele County, Utah. Prior to the plain·
tiff's ownership of these lots, the defendant, a char·
tered city of the State of Utah, entered into a writ·
ten contract on February 1, 1962, wiith the Utah
State Road Commission and Tooele County, Utah,
for the installation of a sewer line in South Coleman
Street, Tooele, Utah. The defendant did not have suf·
ficient funds to pay the cost of installation. The cost
of the sewer extension was $4,102.00. The Road Com·
mission agreed to pay the total amount and receive
reimbursement for the major portion. The persons
who would benefit from the sewer line on the east
side of South Coleman Street were the Utah Stat€

Road Commission Maintenance Area, the defendant
and the County of Tooele, owning approximately
equal tracts. The persons to be benefited on the west
side of South Coleman Street were the private owners of ten ( 10) vacant residential building lots. A
sewer lateral was to be constructed from the trunk
line in the street to the Road Commission Maintenance Area so that the Road Commission could immediately connect to the sewer. The contract provided for the payment of a connection fee of $577.00
by the Road Commission and the balance of $3,525.00
was to be divided equally among the property holders
on either side of the road, being $1, 762.50 for the
east side and a like amount for the west side. The
Road Commission was to receive reimbursement in
the sum of $2,937.50 by way of connection fees of
$587 .50 each from the defendant and Tooele County
and $176.25 from each of the ten (10) residential
building lots. The Road Commission also agreed to
extend the water line at a cost of $2,500.00 which
would include a water lateral line to the Road Commission property so it could receive water immediately.One-half of the cost for the water line, being
$1,250.00, was to be reimbursed to the Road Commission at the rate of $125.00 each for the ten (10)
residential building lots on the west side of South
Coleman Street. The contract further provided that
after the Road Commission had been reimbursed in
the amount of $2,937.50 for the sewer line and $1,250.00 for the water main, these systems would become the property of the defendant, a part of its
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sewage and water systems and under the defendant's
ownership and administration. The sewer and water
lines were installed and the cost was paid by the Road
Commission.
The contract set no time limits in which the
parties must use the benefits therein provided. Also,
no interest charge was to be added to the original investment made by the Road Commission.
At the time this contract was entered into, the
defendant was charging a sewer connection fee of
$·30.00 and a water connection fee of $125.00. Thereafter, on April 11, 1966, the defendant, by Ordinance
Number 66-2, raised the sewer connection fee to
$200.00 for each 4" sewer connection. The water connection fee remained the same at $125.00 for each
%" line connection. These are the same size connec·
tions as those made by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff acquired the ownership of eight
(8) of the ten (10) residential building lots on February 26, 1968. On March 22, 1968, the plaintiff
tendered to the defendant a cashier's check in the
sum of $2,108.75, in payment of the sewer and water
connections for seven (7) of his eight (8) residential
building lots, at the rate set forth in the contract of
February 1, 1962, being $125.00 for each water con·
nection and $176.25 for each sewer connection. At
the time of this tender, the Road Commi1ssion had
not been fully reimbursed and defendant had not
acquired the ownership of the sewer and
lines. Plaintiff's tender was refused and his
cashier's check was returned to him by mail on
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March 26, 1968. The defendant, on March 26,
1968, remitted the balance of the monies to the
Road Commission to fully reimburse it for the
sewer and water lines. Again on March 26, 1968,
the plaintiff made a further tender by cashier's
check in the sum of $1,807.25 in payment of the
sewer and water connection on six ( 6) of his
eight ( 8) lots, at the same contract rate. The second
tender was also rejected and the cashier's check was
returned to the plaintiff on March 28, 1968. The
plaintiff applied to the defendant for a building permit on May 7, 1968, and again on April 8, 1969, but
building permi1ts were refused for the reason that
the plaintiff had not paid the sewer and water connection fees which defendant demanded. On May 7,
1968, the plaintiff paid the defendant $626.25 under
protest for sewer connection fees of $376.25 and
water connection fees of $300.00 on Lot 23, SOUTHLAND TERRACE SUBDIVISION, being one of the
eight ( 8) residential building lots owned by the
plaintiff on South Coleman Street. On April 8, 1969,
the plaintiff paid the defendant a like amount under
protest for the sewer and water connection fees on
Lot 24, SOUTHLAND TERRACE SUBDIVISION.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE COSTS PROVIDED IN
THE WRITTEN CONTRACT WERE ONLY FOR
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INSTALLATION EXPENSES AND NOT CON.
NECTION FEES.
Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact of the
Court, dated February 5, 1970, supporting the judg.
ment on the pleadings, as well as paragraph 6 of the
Findings of Fact of April 8, 1970, supporting the
order denying a re-hearing, state that the contract
referred to provided only for the cost of the installation of water and sewer lines, rather than connection fees, as claimed by the plaintiff. It is contended
that this is not a proper construction of the contract
of February 1, 1962. The attention of the Court is
invited to paragraphs 2 through 7 of the contract,
where the words "connect, connection and connection
charges" are used thirteen ( 13) times. The contract
clearly provides that connections to the sewer line by
the ten (10) residential building lots will be author·
ized at the rate of $176.25 per building unit and to
the water line at the rate of $125.00 per building
unit. No mention is made in the contract of any addi·
tional charges, such as those otherwise charged by
the defendant at the time the contract was executeo
of $30.00 for a sewer connection and $125.00 for a
water connection. The plaintiff maintains that a
proper construction of the contract is that the sums
provided are actually connection fees, as stated, ano
not just installation expenses. Further, that the
plaintiff has the right to connect to the sewer and
water lines upon the payment of $176.25 for a sewer
connection and $125.00 for a water connection, being
the sums expressed in the contract, without paying
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the additional amounts demanded by the defendant
of $200.00 for a connection to the sewer and $125.00
for the water connection.
In construing contracts, Courts seek to determine the intentions of the parties and will hold contracting parties to their clear and understandable
language deliberately committed to writing and
signed by them. (Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 U2d
276, 323 P2d 259; Richards Irrigation Co. vs. Westview Irrigation Co., 96 U 403, 80 P2d 458.) The defendant is a chartered city of the State of Utah, having its own engineers and legal counsel and must be
presumed to know the meaning of the words "connect, connections and connection charges." These
words are customarily used to express the charge
made by a city such as the defendant, or a sewer district, for the privilege of connecting to its sewer line.
The defendant was a party to the contract and is
bound by its terms. This contract should be construed
as of the time and place it was executed and in accordance wiith its manifest intent. (C.J.S. Contracts
s. 359.)
POINT II
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION F 0 R
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IN ITS
FAVOR, IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT AND DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A RE-HEARING.
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A motion for judgment on the pleadings is not
favored by the Court. (Harman vs. Yeager, 100 U.
30, 110 P. 2d. 352.) It should be granted only when
there is no question of fact material to the issues
raised by the pleadings and as a matter of law the
moving party is clearly entitled to judgment on the
pleadings.
The plaintiff respectfully submits that the lower
Court was in error both as a matter of fact and law.
The Court did not seem to understand the factual
setting for the written contract, nor the reasons for
its execution. Also, in interpreting the contract as a
matter of law, the Court seems to have disregarded
the significant words, "connect, connections and connection charges," and what to the plaintiff is the
manifest intent, i.e., to provide for the installation of
sewer and water lines in South Coleman Street, in·
eluding all connection charges. At the very least, it
is felt the wording of the contract raises a question
as to its meaning through the use of the words quoted
above and in fairness to the plaintiff, the case
should have been tried and the plaintiff allowed the
opportunity to present evidence in favor of his inter·
pretation and the allegations of his complaint. The
plaintiff was not represented by counsel in the lower
Court and it is possible he was unable to clearly pre·
sent his views so the Court would understand them.
The standard of interpretation of an integrated
agreement, except where it produces an ambiguous
result, or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a
definite meaning, is the meaning that would attach
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to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person
acquainted with all the operative useages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than
oral statements by the parties of what they intended
it to mean. (Erickson vs. Bastion, 98 U. 587, 102 P.
2d 310; Re-statement of the Law - Contracts s. 230.)
It is earnestly contended that had the lower Court
applied this case law, it would not, and should not
have granted the defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. The questions raised by the contract
of February 1, 1962, should have entitled the plaintiff to a trial of the issues. The intention of the parties to a written contract must ordinarily be determined by an examination of the writing, but if it is
ambiguous and the intention of the parties cannot
be determined from the writing itself, parol evidence
is admissible to show such intention. (Wilford State
Bank vs. Westfield Canal & Irrigation Co., 108 U.
528, 162 P. 2d. 101.)
In passing, the plaintiff desires to point out to
the Court that in many sewage systems, the connection fee is used in whole or in part to defray the costs
of installing sewer lines. If such is the case in this
matter, the plaintiff is being forced to pay twice for
these construction costs, once under the contract of
February 1, 1962, and again through his requi1red
payment of the city's connection fee. This is another
reason why it is felt the lower Court should have received evidence in a trial.
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Finally, the plaintiff, not being a party to the
contract of February 1, 1962, should not be required
to both pay the connection fees stated therein, as well
as the defendant's ordained connection fee, but
should be able to pay one or the other.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff respectfully contends that the contract of February 1, 1962, covers both connection fees
and installation expenses, that this Court should so
hold and remand this cause to the lower Court with
appropriate instructions. Otherwise, the plaintiff
will be subjected to double sewer and water connec·
tion fees, which is not only unfair but contrary to the
manifest intent of the contract.
However, should this Court determine there is
a question on the interpretation of the contract, then
at the very least, this cause should be remanded to
the lower Court for further proceedings, including
the taking of evidence in a trial.
And finally, the plaintiff should not be subjected
both to sewer and water connection fees under the
contract as well as to the connection fees under the
defendant's ordinance.
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A number of additional matters were argued by
the
in the lower Court, as evidenced in their
written briefs. However, this brief is, and must be
directed only to the Findings, Conclusions and J udgment of the lower Court.
Respectfully submitted,
HALLIDAY & HALLIDAY
400 Executive Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

